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Tuesday, May 26, 2026

 Amnesty-UK writes:



Over 800,000 Palestinians displaced in 1948?

In 1997, Amnesty wrote in a report that "Between 600,000 and 780,000 Arabs fled from the territory
controlled by Israel, becoming refugees in neighbouring territories. "  At that time, Amnesty agreed that there were wide disputes as to the real figures, and it used the language of "fleeing" rather than forcibly displaced. 

Since then, Ephraim Karsh has persuasively argued that the actual figure is between 583,000 and 609,000, giving village by village numbers, and showing that most of the Arabs fled out of fear, not from any expulsion policy.

Amnesty was not persuaded.

In 2019, Amnesty said "2019 marks 71 years since the expulsion and displacement of more than 700,000 Palestinians from their homes, villages and cities"

In 2023, Amnesty said "more than 750,000 Palestinians were forcibly displaced."


And today we are at 800,000.

That is a 33% inflation from Amnesty's own 1997 floor, with roughly 15% of that coming in the last seven years alone. More significant than the number is the mechanism: "fled" became "expulsion and displacement," which became "forcibly displaced" — a progression that collapses the distinction between flight, fear-driven departure, localized expulsions, and centrally directed ethnic cleansing into a single undifferentiated category.

There are no new facts. There is no new research cited. Amnesty's language has evolved in one ideological direction without any new evidentiary basis. Uncertainty became certainty; a disputed range became a fixed number; complex wartime displacement became unilateral forced expulsion. Of course wartime itself is coercive — which is why historians have always distinguished between flight, expulsion, and evacuation, and why erasing those distinctions is historically significant. But Jews lived in fear, too - and had nowhere to flee.

Prominent Palestinians have acknowledged the more complicated reality. Mahmoud Abbas himself described his own family as having fled Safed during the war — driven by unfounded fear that the local Jews would exact revenge for the 1929 massacres by Arabs there, not expulsion orders. That testimony does not fit Amnesty's current framing, and Amnesty has not updated its account to engage it.

Amnesty is changing history, in one direction, and we can see it clearly.

Sunday, May 24, 2026

Thursday, May 21, 2026

 Tonight begins Shavuot, the holiday celebrating the giving of the Torah at Sinai — the moment the Jewish people received the text that would eventually become the moral foundation of Western civilization itself.

In 1939, Shavuot fell a week after Britain issued its White Paper closing Mandatory Palestine to Jewish refugees. Cartoonist Arie Navon marked the coincidence in Davar with a drawing showing a figure representing the Jewish people handing Colonial Secretary Malcolm MacDonald the Tanach, Jewish Scripture. MacDonald hands back Ha-Sefer Ha-Lavan — the White Paper, in Hebrew "The White Book," his own document blocking European Jews from seeking shelter in Palestine from the upcoming Holocaust. The caption is "ספר תחת ספר" — "a book for a book."



The Jews gave the world its moral vocabulary; the world handed them a death warrant dressed as policy. Within six years, six million Jews who could not reach Palestine were slaughtered.

The exchange has not stopped — only the packaging has changed.

Mohammed Khatib, European Coordinator of Samidoun and a founding member of Masar Badil, was sanctioned by the U.S. Treasury on May 19, 2026 alongside other figures linked to Hamas and the pro-Hamas flotilla network. In an October 2025 interview translated by MEMRI, he was explicit about the scope of the project: once Palestine is liberated "from the River to the Sea," the movement should turn to liberating the United States, Canada, and Australia, because "this system of white supremacy and racism must be abolished and dismantled by all means." 

This is the vision Israel is holding the line against — a revolutionary doctrine that treats the Jewish state as the forward position of a global order requiring demolition. The tools being used against Israel today are designed to accomplish what the White Paper accomplished: make it legally and politically impossible for Jews to defend themselves. Arab states pressured the Rome Statute's drafters to classify settlement policy as a war crime on par with genocide "Genocide" has been redefined to describe a military campaign that killed fewer civilians per sortie than any comparable urban operation in modern warfare. "Apartheid" has been stretched until it covers any state that asserts a particular national character - yet it is only applied to Israel. These are  legal concepts rebuilt around Israel, promoted and normalized by people who have announced openly what comes next once Israel falls.

Israel's response to that doctrine comes from the same source as the original gift. The IDF operates under Ruach Tzahal — the Spirit of the IDF, a published ethical code rooted explicitly in Jewish tradition, requiring soldiers to use force only to the extent necessary, to protect non-combatants, and to maintain their humanity in combat. That framework predates the Geneva Conventions by three millennia and is more morally serious — because it rests on obligation rather than negotiated consent, and because it was designed for a world containing genuinely malign actors, not the imaginary world of symmetrical state armies that international law assumes. Israel has prosecuted its own soldiers for violations of that doctrine. It does so while fighting enemies who deliberately use civilians as weapons, who store munitions in hospitals, and whose leadership has declared in plain language that Israel is only their first target.

Navon's cartoon assumed the exchange was asymmetric only in tragedy. MacDonald at least was responding to a real political problem with a wrong solution. The current exchange is more cynical: the instruments being handed to Israel are promoted and often drafted by people who have told us exactly what they plan to do with Western civilization once Israel is out of the way.

The Jews gave the world its moral vocabulary. Today, while progressive institutions wield international law as a weapon against Israel, Western military leaders travel to Israel to learn how to fight modern wars where malign actors use international law itself as a primary weapon. Armies know very well what the progressive elite either ignore or actively oppose: that defending your own citizens is every nation's top priority. 

On Shavuot, it is worth remembering what Israel gives to the world - and what the world keeps handing back.

Tuesday, May 19, 2026

 

On Being Taken Seriously

A response to Michael Walzer's engagement with "Towards a New Theory of War"


I like to swing for the fences. 

In March, at the beginning of the US/Israeli war on Iran, I published a four-part series arguing that Western war theory rests on a category error — treating war as a discrete episode rather than a continuous relationship — and that revolutionary movements have spent decades exploiting that error. Therefore, I proposed an entirely new theory of war that I think aligns more with how reality works than with how international law has evolved. I freely admit that I have no academic expertise in this or many other topics I write about but I will come up with an idea, research it and write about it fairly quickly.

Marcia Kupfer, an independent scholar, was impressed enough with my argument that she invited Michael Walzer — author of Just and Unjust Wars, the book that shaped modern just war theory and long formed part of the West Point curriculum — to comment on my series. Walzer is one of the world's  most distinguished intellectuals.

Whoa.

Walzer took my arguments seriously, in detail. He agreed with some of what I argued, pushed back on other parts, and raised challenges. 

Here I will try to respond to his well reasoned points. Kupfer gave an excellent summary of my series that is worth reading in her Substack.

What I argued

The series made five interconnected claims. Western international law treats war as episodic — a discrete event with a legal trigger, a period of hostilities, and an end. Revolutionary movements, from Lenin through Mao through Islamism, treat war as continuous — a permanent state aimed at total transformation. The imminence doctrine at the heart of international law cannot address threats that are real, building, and existential but not yet "imminent" in any legally recognizable sense. The right diagnostic question before committing to any military response is: if this episodic war is won, does that actually neutralize the threat? The answer determines not just whether to fight, but what victory requires. And the existing international legal framework cannot be reformed from within — any rule flexible enough to address these problems is flexible enough to be claimed by Russia against Ukraine, by Iran against Israel.

The series drew on John Locke's definition of the state of war — declared hostile intent combined with the capacity to act on it, not active hostilities — and argued that this understanding is war as a relationship is what modern international law quietly abandoned in favor of looking at war as an episode. I claim that looking at war as an event has been systematically weaponized by revolutionary actors.

Walzer has a much more comprehensive view of history than I do. He brings up excellent counterarguments to my assertion that revolutionary movements never end until victory or total annihilation; it is a stretch to say the Korean War is still being waged and he notes that the communists won the Vietnam War but now the US has close to normal relations with them which is inconsistent with perpetual war. 

Perhaps I can sharpen the distinction - as he notes, often the revolutionaries become statists when they reach power so the ideology becomes secondary to control. Identifying their own incentives and trajectory is critical in deciding on how to respond to aggression from a self-defined revolutionary state. Walzer argues that China is more statist than revolutionary today, but I think my argument that the US is in a war-relationship with China is still accurate; China is acting in a way consistent with long-term victory over the US, currently using its expertise in surveillance, stealing technology, making other nations dependent on it for infrastructure and using social media to divide Western societies. 

So rather than fixate on Marx and Islamism as revolutionary movements - and Walzer is correct that original Marxism did not support war as the means of revolution - my argument needs to lean more on my idea of war as relationship. Relationships can change over time, as his Vietnam example proves. 

The question is, I think, when an ideology is regarded a more important than statism. My quote of Mao saying that he would gladly sacrifice hundreds of millions of Chinese to win over the West is true but Walzer is also accurate in saying that China is acting more statist than strictly revolutionary. The important thing is whether a nation would change its strategy in response to external events or only its tactics. That is where Western responses to anti-Western states and movements need to concentrate. 

Iran appears to still prioritize ideology over all. Saudi Arabia, also a state that officially follows Islam as its constitution, has shown far more pragmatism in dealing with the West. 

Israel's major error with Hamas was being lulled into thinking that the group was acting pragmatically to help its people and not recognizing that its desire to destroy Israel had not abated - and its pragmatism was a well planned deception. The idea that they would willingly sacrifice tens of thousands of its citizens just to gain public relations points was not seriously considered, let alone that this would be its guiding (and largely successful) military strategy.

Which brings us to the difference between dealing with Islamist ideologies and The Cold War. 

Walzer notes that there were repeated calls for preventive war against the Soviet Union — "strike now before we are struck" — and that it was wise to reject them. The Marshall Plan, NATO, the Voice of America, diplomatic contacts throughout: these ultimately prevailed. If communism ever inspired eternal war against Western capitalism, "the inspiration had a beginning and an end. It was smart to wait it out."

The implication is clear. If it was smart to wait out Soviet communism despite its universalist ambitions and nuclear arsenal, the same patience might apply to Iranian revolutionary Islamism.

I would argue that The Cold War worked because the Soviet Union had a survival interest. Mutual Assured Destruction was a credible deterrent precisely because Soviet leadership — whatever its ideological commitments — valued the survival of the Soviet state and Soviet society. Khrushchev blinked during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Brezhnev pursued détente. The ideological commitment to world revolution consistently yielded to the instinct for national self-preservation. That instinct is what made waiting viable.

Hamas didn't care about its leaders' survival. It cares about Islam's ultimate victory. And so does Iran. 

Khomeini stated explicitly: "We do not worship Iran. We worship Allah. Let this land burn, let it go up in smoke as long as Islam wins in the end." This is the constitutional doctrine of the Islamic Republic, institutionalized in its schools, its Friday prayers, its Revolutionary Guard theology, its proxy network. The regime was founded on the explicit subordination of national survival to revolutionary purpose.

Deterrence requires a rational actor who values survival at a rate sufficient to be deterred. The Soviet deterrence calculation was: launch and be annihilated, or don't launch and survive. Iranian revolutionary doctrine has institutionalized martyrdom as a religious virtue, constructed proxy forces specifically designed to absorb losses while Iran maintains deniability, and for forty years demonstrated consistent willingness to accept enormous costs — including economic devastation from sanctions — rather than abandon the revolutionary project. Shame culture reinforces this at every level — even tiny concessions are read as weakness, and symbolism consistently trumps reality.

There is also a technical asymmetry between Iran and the Cold War. The Cold War "wait it out" strategy was applied to a nuclear-armed adversary — the Soviet Union already had the weapons. The deterrence logic that made waiting viable depended on both sides having the capability and dreading its use. An Iran approaching the nuclear threshold is a categorically different problem. Once that threshold is crossed, the deterrence calculation inverts: instead of waiting being viable, waiting forecloses the option entirely. The Begin Doctrine — applied at Osirak in 1981, at Deir ez-Zor in 2007, against Iran in 2026 — is precisely the recognition that the window for the "wait it out" strategy closes as capability approaches threshold, and that the closing is irreversible. Walzer defended Israel's 1967 preemptive strike on the grounds of imminent threat. The Iranian nuclear program was a threat played out over decades rather than days, without a clear casus belli but where waiting is suicidal. No one can doubt that Iran would deploy a nuclear weapon against Israel and willingly sacrifice a couple of million Palestinians if they thought they could. 

Waiting Iran out might result in a successful popular uprising, or it might result in a nuclear weapon and delivery system. The latter is unfortunately more likely than the former. 

The other major challenge he makes is to my idea that each nation should prioritize their own people over their enemies. 

Walzer defends the position he and Avishai Margalit argued in Haaretz: that innocent men and women on both sides of a conflict have equal value. He reads my framework as relaxing that principle, making it "a little easier to fight against insurgents hiding among civilians" by valuing Israeli civilians at a higher rate than Gazan civilians.

I am not arguing that enemy civilians have less inherent worth as human beings. I'm saying that states have concentric circles of responsibility — to their own citizens first, to enemy civilians second — and that these circles reflect the source of a state's moral and political legitimacy, not a ranking of human worth. A government's primary claim on its citizens' obedience and sacrifice derives from its commitment to protect them. A government that sacrifices its citizens to protect enemy civilians has not demonstrated superior morality. It has inverted the moral basis of its own authority. And current international law supports this: no army is expected to endanger its own soldiers to reduce casualties of the enemy, and the laws of proportionality as adjudicated are far more favorable to the military than the standards applied to Israel. This is not a description of the value of lives but of reality: just as a parent would save her own child over another's, a state must prioritize their own citizens and an army must prioritize its own members. This is the social contract we all live under. 

If armies are expected to weigh all lives equally, that means that Hamas' human shield strategy is impossible to defeat. I would be interested to know how the equal-value principle generates operational guidance in a situation where Hamas has deliberately structured the battlefield to make Israeli restraint a Hamas strategic asset.

I deeply appreciate the discussion. Walzer could have dismissed this series. A pseudonymous blogger arguing that the experts got it wrong, published on Substack, is not an obvious target for serious engagement. He chose to engage seriously, carefully, and generously — identifying where I was right, identifying where he disagrees, and raising the hardest available challenge to my central argument. That is what intellectual discourse is supposed to look like, and it happens far less often than it should.

My theory of war is part of my larger philosophical work. If the framework I have been developing holds up under serious scrutiny from the field's most important living thinker in this domain  — not unscathed, but standing — then it may be worth developing further.

That is what I intend to do.


Monday, May 11, 2026





Buy EoZ's books  on Amazon!

Reclaiming the Covenant on America's 250th (May 2026)

"He's an Anti-Zionist Too!" cartoon book (December 2024)

PROTOCOLS: Exposing Modern Antisemitism (February 2022)

   

 

 

Wednesday, May 6, 2026

dsa

 I previously wrote about the contradiction between Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Rashida Tlaib's membership in the Democratic Socialists of America and their oath of office to defend the Constitution. 


The problem runs deeper. The DSA's goals are more anti-American, more illiberal, and more against the principles of the Democratic Party itself than the media tells you. 

The DSA's current platform describes these goals:

Our goal is to put workers in charge of the government through a new democratic constitution that establishes civil, political, and democratic rights for all, is based on proportional representation in a single federal legislature, and ends the role of money in politics.

Reading this carefully, there is a glaring contradiction. The DSA program says that they would provide "civil, political, and democratic rights for all," but the only people allowed to be in charge of the government are "workers." This means that anyone who is not a worker under socialist theory — the McDonald's worker who just got promoted to assistant manager, the immigrant who scraped together money to open a bodega in Brooklyn and who hires a local teen to make deliveries, the hotdog pushcart vendor, the project manager at a high-tech company, the middle-class 401(k) holder who invests in the stock market and is therefore a partial owner of large corporations — is ineligible to be in the government. These non-workers do not have the right to participate in governing.

The socialists support rights, but not equal rights for all. Some 30% of the American workforce do not qualify as "workers" under the DSA definition because they are self-employed, managers, small business owners or supervisors. About 60% own equities through investments which means that they are partial owners of major corporations. Saying that a large portion of Americans cannot join the government is not only anti-American — it goes against everything the Western liberal world has stood for over the past two centuries: unalienable rights and the dignity of all humans.

The DSA can no longer be dismissed as a mere fringe group.  DSA's membership grew from roughly 50,000 in October 2024 to over 90,000 by December 2025, nearly doubling in just over a year — fueled first by Trump's reelection and then by Mamdani's mayoral campaign. Over 250 DSA members now hold elected office across 40 states, with 90% of them elected after 2019 — including 96 city councilors and county commissioners, eight mayors or county executives, and significant council blocs in Chicago, Portland, Minneapolis, and Los Angeles. At the federal level it holds two House seats. And its most prominent recent success is Zohran Mamdani, the mayor of New York City

The media has largely covered this as a sign of democratic vitality — an energized grassroots left finding its voice. What the media has declined to cover with equal energy is what DSA actually says it wants to do with that power, in its own words, in its own publications, discussed openly at its own conventions.

This next passage from the same platform makes the internal logic explicit:

"With a government by, for, and of the working class and with powerful labor unions and social movements organizing in every city and town, we hope to build a socialist society..."

This is a deliberate rewriting of Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, where he said "that government of the people, by the people, for the people, shall not perish from the earth." The DSA wants that government to perish. It has replaced "the people" — all of them — with "the working class," a category DSA itself defines and controls.

This is not only an anti-American platform that cynically rewrites one of America's most important speeches — a speech that genuinely did champion equal rights for all people. It is a platform more extreme than anything found in the major parties of Europe. Even the Green parties, the most radical formations operating in mainstream Western parliaments — the ones willing to block traffic, disrupt fossil fuel infrastructure, and push the outer limits of acceptable political action — ground themselves explicitly in universal rights. The European Green Party states that its belief in democracy is "founded upon the mutual recognition of all individuals as equals" and explicitly invokes "inalienable rights" as the foundation of its politics. The British Greens are characterized by political scientists as holding "libertarian-universalistic values" — left, libertarian, and committed to universal rights without class qualification.

DSA's own platform acknowledges that its vision "pushes further than historic social democracy." This is accurate, and DSA means it as a boast. What the boast reveals is that DSA has stepped outside the liberal framework that every mainstream left party in the democratic world — Labour, the SPD, the Scandinavian social democrats, the Greens — operates within. Those parties argue about what the state owes its citizens. DSA is arguing about which citizens the state is for.

The DSA Is Not Part of the Democratic Party. It Says So Itself.

The media's framing of DSA as the Democratic Party's progressive wing isn't just imprecise — it inverts the reality. DSA doesn't consider itself part of the Democratic Party. Its own documents, conventions, and internal debates make this explicit.

Start with policy. The 2024 Democratic Party platform supports the existing Constitution, backs Israel as a key ally, calls for secure borders alongside expanded legal immigration, and supports funding accountable policing. DSA's platform calls for replacing the Constitution entirely, opposes any legitimacy for Israel, opposes all border enforcement as racist and anti-working-class, and treats policing as a capitalist tool of class control. These are not differences of degree. They are direct contradictions on foundational questions.

Then there is the strategy. DSA's dominant electoral approach — endorsed at its 2025 National Convention without serious dissent — is called the "dirty break." The concept is straightforward: run socialist candidates on the Democratic Party ballot line because third-party runs fail under America's winner-take-all electoral system, use those campaigns to build an independent organizational infrastructure, then abandon the Democratic Party entirely once DSA has accumulated enough power to survive on its own. The Democratic ballot line is a ladder. The plan has always been to kick it away.

This is not inferred from DSA's behavior. It is stated in DSA's own publications. One DSA-aligned outlet describes the Democratic Party as "the reactionary capitalist graveyard of social movements" and calls on DSA to break from it urgently. Another describes the dirty break strategy plainly: run on the Democratic line "but use their campaigns to build an independent party-like organization capable of eventually becoming strong enough to break from the Democratic Party." The Metro DC DSA chapter states plainly on its own website that it organizes "as a quasi-political party to build power independent from the corporate and wealthy interests that pull the Democratic Party to the right" — treating the Democratic Party as an obstacle to be worked around, not a home.

This is not a secret. It is debated openly in DSA publications, conventions, and strategy documents. The media's choice to describe DSA as the Democrats' left flank, rather than as a self-described Trojan horse using the Democratic ballot line as a temporary vehicle toward goals the Democratic Party itself explicitly rejects, is a failure of basic reporting.

The Leaders Who Don't Qualify Under Their Own Rules

If DSA's platform is taken seriously, its most prominent elected officials present a problem the organization has never resolved.

Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez worked as a bartender and waitress before her 2018 election — genuinely working class by almost any definition. She now earns $174,000 a year, employs a large staff, wields significant institutional power, and answers to no employer extracting surplus value from her labor. Rashida Tlaib spent a decade as a Michigan state representative before reaching Congress; her career has been in law and politics, not production. Zohran Mamdani  is a former academic and career politician whose only non-political work experience was a stint as a housing counselor, almost certainly for a nonprofit or government agency, meaning he has never worked for an exploitative capitalist by DSA's own definition of the term.

Under DSA's Marxist class analysis, none of these people are workers. They are state functionaries and professional-managerial class members — the layer that orthodox Marxist theory regards with suspicion as structurally unreliable representatives of proletarian interests. DSA has built its public face out of people its own framework disqualifies, and has never acknowledged the contradiction, because acknowledging it would require applying the framework honestly.

The problem extends downward. Each of these officials employs a paid staff: schedulers, communications directors, legislative aides, district office workers. Those employees sell their labor to a boss who sets their pay, controls their working conditions, and can terminate them. Under DSA's own class analysis, AOC and Tlaib and Mamdani are not their staffs' comrades — they are their staffs' employers, which is precisely the relationship DSA's platform identifies as exploitation. The movement to liberate the working class is being led by professional politicians who are, on their own terms, exploiting the workers beneath them. DSA is willing to overlook its own foundational principles whenever the person being promoted is sufficiently well-credentialed and sufficiently useful — which is to say, whenever the principles become inconvenient.

Rights For Some

DSA's contempt for genuine equal rights doesn't remain abstract. Its platform  endorses Palestinian terrorism as described in the ‘al-Thawabit’ principles set by the Palestinian National Council in 1977,  which means treating armed attacks on Israeli civilians as legitimate political action. DSA has made this a near-expulsion issue internally, withdrawing its endorsement of Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez in part over her insufficient support for it.

Once you establish that some civilians' right to life is contingent on their political context — that Israeli civilians are legitimate targets because of the class or national position DSA assigns them — you have abandoned the premise that rights are universal. You have conceded that rights are political awards, granted to those on the correct side of the correct struggle and withheld from those who are not. Every subsequent guarantee of "rights for all" in DSA's platform rests on the same logic: rights exist for those whom the workers' government recognizes as deserving them.

History has seen this before. The Soviet constitution of 1936 — Stalin's constitution — was praised at the time as one of the most progressive documents ever written. It guaranteed free speech, freedom of the press, freedom of assembly, and the inviolability of the person, for all Soviet citizens. The workers were supposedly in charge of the government. These rights existed on paper. What followed is known. The lesson is not that DSA will necessarily replicate Stalinist terror — it is that "rights for all" under "workers in charge" has a track record and it isn't good. There is nothing that the DSA, or Marxist theory in general, does to structurally block the system they want to build from becoming worse than what they want to replace. 

The United States Constitution was designed precisely to prevent concentrated power, recognizing the potential for abuse. Its architecture of separated powers, checks and balances, federalism, and individual rights protections exists to ensure that no faction — however righteous its self-description — can accumulate enough power to silence those who disagree with it. The framers understood that the danger to liberty comes not from obvious tyrants but from movements convinced of their own virtue. They built a system that protects minorities, dissenters, and the politically disfavored against majorities who believe they have history on their side.

DSA's platform contains none of these safeguards. Its new democratic constitution would concentrate power in a single federal legislature, eliminate the Senate's counter-majoritarian role, gut judicial review, and place governance in the hands of a class defined by DSA itself. The people DSA disagrees with — the bodega owner, the assistant manager, the 401(k) holder, the Zionist — have no structural protection in this vision, only the goodwill of the workers' government. That goodwill, as the Soviet constitution demonstrated, is not a substitute for rights.

DSA is, in the end, everything it claims to oppose: a movement seeking concentrated power, using the language of liberation to justify removing rights from those it has decided don't deserve them, hiding an authoritarian logic inside democratic vocabulary. The Constitution it wants to replace was built by people who understood exactly this danger. That is why DSA wants to replace it.

Sunday, May 3, 2026

 

(Part 1 of a series on "The Jewish Question")

Across the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, the phrase "the Jewish Question" — die Judenfrage in German, la question juive in French, the Jewish problem in English — saturated European discourse. 

But what, exactly, was the Jewish Question?

Strangely, there is no single answer. 

The phrase was ubiquitous. There were multiple books titled The Jewish Question or The Jewish Problem. There were countless newspaper articles, pamphlets, parliamentary speeches, and learned essays addressing it. One scholar catalogued 1,230 sources (books, pamphlets, articles, speeches, meetings) on the topic in a single decade from 1875-1884. 

But looking at these sources does not help define the question. They presume the reader already knows.

It appeared in Hegelian philosophy and in evangelical missionary tracts. It was the title of Bruno Bauer's 1843 treatise and Karl Marx's 1844 reply. It was used by French revolutionaries debating emancipation and by German racial theorists demanding separation. It appeared in respectable London newspapers as routine political vocabulary, requiring no definition because every reader was assumed to know what it meant. By 1939, when the Nazi government published Germany and the Jewish Problem, the phrase had been a fixture of European discourse for nearly two centuries, deployed across every political ideology, in every Western language, by every kind of publication.

The one thing nearly everyone using the phrase seemed to agree on was that the Jewish Question was not antisemitism. On the contrary. It was meant to be the alternative to antisemitism. It was the considered intellectual response to a real problem, the kind of thing serious people engaged with in contrast to the rabble who merely hated Jews.

For example, on November 7, 1881, the Pall Mall Gazette of London printed a brief telegram from Berlin under the headline "Prince Bismarck and the Jewish Question." The Tageblatt, organ of the German anti-Jewish Conservatives, was replying to remarks Bismarck had reportedly made condemning anti-Jewish agitation. The Conservatives wanted to clarify their position. "We have always condemned the brutalities of Jew-baiting," they wrote, "but these must not be confounded with the Jewish question, which is well founded. The Jewish question exists in spite of the supposed opinion of Prince Bismarck, and if the Prince adheres to the statement attributed to him, the Jewish question will exist even against him."

The German Conservatives — the leading anti-Jewish party of their moment — were drawing a line between two things they regarded as entirely distinct. On one side was Jew-baiting: vulgar, brutal, the kind of thing respectable people condemned. On the other side was the Jewish Question: serious, well-founded, a matter that any thinking person was obliged to engage with. The Conservatives located their moral position in being against the first while being committed to the second. They were not antisemites, by their lights. They were responsible men, addressing a real problem, in contrast to the ignorant bigots who physically attacked Jews.

For the educated nineteenth-century European, pogroms were awful and blood libels were medieval superstition. But the Jewish Question — that was something else. That was a matter of serious analysis.

So what was the analysis? What did the Question actually claim?

The texts will not tell you directly. They presume the reader already knows. The only way to recover what the Question meant is to work backward from the solutions its serious analysts proposed. If we can identify the solutions, we can reconstruct the questions they were meant to answer. The result is illuminating, and not in the way the analysts intended.

Four solutions, four problems

Consider four representative texts.

In 1883, Arnold Frank, a licentiate of the Irish Presbyterian Church, published The Jewish Problem and Its Solution through the Bible and Colportage Society of Belfast. Frank was an evangelical Protestant of unimpeachable respectability. The solution he proposed was conversion, pursued through evangelism. The Christian world, he wrote, had a duty to win the Jew for Christ — "if it were for nothing else than self defence," because Jewish religious influence undermined Christian belief. Working backward from this solution, the question Frank was answering becomes clear: Jews refuse the true faith and undermine those who hold it. What should we do? For Frank, the Jewish Problem was a religious problem. The condition that made Jews problematic was their continued existence as Jews, which conversion would remedy.

A century earlier, in December 1789, the French revolutionary Stanislas de Clermont-Tonnerre rose in the National Assembly to defend Jewish emancipation. He was a liberal and a constitutional monarchist, on the progressive side of the debate, advocating equal rights for Protestants and Jews against those who wanted to maintain the centuries-old exclusions. The solution he proposed has echoed through every subsequent discussion of Jewish citizenship: "We must refuse everything to the Jews as a nation, and accord everything to Jews as individuals." Working backward, the question becomes: Jews constitute a corporate body within the state — with their own laws, their own institutions, their own communal courts — incompatible with the unified citizenship the Republic requires. What should we do? For Clermont-Tonnerre, the Jewish Question was a political-organizational problem. The condition that made Jews problematic was Jewish communal existence, which dissolution of Jewish institutions would remedy.

In 1844, Karl Marx published Zur Judenfrage — "On the Jewish Question" — replying to Bruno Bauer. Marx reframed the entire debate. The solution he proposed was structural: the abolition of the social conditions that produced both Judaism and capitalism. The closing line of the essay is unambiguous: "the social emancipation of the Jew is the emancipation of society from Judaism." Working backward, the question becomes: Jewish economic activity — usury, commerce, what Marx called "huckstering" — is capitalism in concentrated form. What should we do? For Marx, the Jewish Question was an economic problem. The condition that made Jews problematic was the persistence of the social form Judaism allegedly expressed, which revolutionary transformation would remedy - and leave the world with no Judaism.

In 1879, Wilhelm Marr published Der Sieg des Judenthums über das Germanenthum — "The Victory of Jewry over Germandom" — and helped popularize a new word for an old position. Marr coined "antisemitism" specifically to give Jew-hatred a scientific veneer, distinguishing his position from what he portrayed as backward religious prejudice. The solution he proposed was racial separation, which his successors would push toward catastrophic conclusion. Working backward, the question becomes: Jews are a biologically distinct people whose hereditary characteristics make them permanently incompatible with German national life. What should we do? For Marr, the Jewish Question was a racial problem. The condition that made Jews problematic was their biological inheritance, which no conversion or civic emancipation could touch.

These are not four facets of one problem. They are four different problems with four different referents and four different proposed remedies. Frank's religious problem cannot be solved by economic transformation. Marr's racial problem cannot be solved by conversion. Clermont-Tonnerre's organizational problem cannot be solved by changes in the social conditions of production. Marx's economic problem cannot be solved by the dissolution of communal courts. The four frameworks did not merely disagree about details. They disagreed about what kind of thing the Jewish Question even was.

And yet all four called what they were addressing "the Jewish Question." All four believed they were treating the same subject. Across a century of discourse, no one seems to have been particularly bothered by the fact that the people writing about "the Jewish Question" did not agree, even at the most basic level, on what the Question actually was. Yet everyone agreed that there was a question.

What the shared phrase actually meant

Each framework began from the conviction that Jewish existence was the kind of presence that required management. Frank knew Jews were a religious problem because his theology said so. Clermont-Tonnerre knew Jews were a political problem because his Republicanism said so. Marx knew Jews were an economic problem because his materialism said so. Marr knew Jews were a racial problem because his pseudo-science said so. Each was correct given his framework. But the framework did not generate the conclusion that Jews required treatment. The conclusion preceded the framework. The framework provided respectable contemporary vocabulary in which the prior conclusion could be articulated.

This becomes visible when you examine what happened as proposed solutions failed. Spain attempted the religious solution in the fifteenth century, demanding conversion or expulsion. The conversos who chose conversion were persecuted as crypto-Jews for generations afterward. If the problem had really been religious, conversion would have ended it. It did not. 

France attempted the political solution in 1791, granting full civic emancipation conditional on the dissolution of Jewish corporate identity. But Napoleon convened a Grand Sanhedrin to determine if Jews can really live in France as normal citizens. A century later, the Dreyfus Affair revealed that emancipated French Jews remained suspect as Jews. If the problem had really been organizational, civic equality would have ended it. It did not. 

The Soviet Union attempted the economic solution after 1917, abolishing the bourgeois conditions Marx had identified. Soviet antisemitism flourished anyway, eventually producing its own state-sponsored persecutions. If the problem had really been economic, abolishing capitalism would have ended it. It did not. 

Germany attempted the racial solution under the Nazis, and the catastrophe needs no description.

Each "solution" failed in the same way. A specific proposed answer was implemented, the proposed answer did not resolve the discomfort with Jewish presence, and a new framework was selected to articulate why Jewish presence remained problematic. Religious gave way to political gave way to economic gave way to racial. Each successor framework presented itself as the deeper analysis that the previous framework had missed. None of them ever considered the possibility that the Question itself was not what it claimed to be.

Real political questions, when their proposed solutions fail, generate refinement of analysis. The Eastern Question was reformulated repeatedly across the nineteenth century as Ottoman conditions changed, but each reformulation was a closer approach to the actual referent — the Ottoman Empire's relationship with European powers. The Irish Question evolved from Catholic Emancipation through Home Rule through partition, but the evolution tracked actual changes in the Anglo-Irish relationship. When the referent was finally addressed, the Question dissolved.

The Jewish Question never got refined. It got replaced. Each new framework was not a closer approach to a real referent but a fresh respectable vocabulary deployed when the previous one had become embarrassing. The pattern is the diagnostic of cognitive architecture rather than honest inquiry. A question whose stated referent keeps changing is a question whose actual referent is something else.

The actual referent — the one all four frameworks shared, beneath their respective vocabularies — was the assumption that Jewish existence as Jewish existence was the kind of presence European societies could not simply accommodate. The Question was always what should we do about our Jews?, with the answer "something" already settled, and the rationale to be supplied by whichever framework the era found most respectable.

The respectable form

This brings us back to the German Conservatives of 1881 and to the most important feature of the Jewish Question as a discursive form. Each of the four frameworks I have described did not merely articulate the assumption that Jewish presence required resolution. Each one presented itself, in its own moment, as the moderate and enlightened position — explicitly defined against a cruder antisemitism it considered beneath itself.

Arnold Frank was not a medieval Christian persecutor. He was a Belfast Presbyterian writing in the post-Enlightenment evangelical tradition. He did not endorse pogroms or forced conversion at sword-point. He represented the Protestant reform of Christian-Jewish relations: love them, pray for them, send missionaries, persuade them. By the standards of the world he had inherited, Frank was a moral progressive. He understood himself as advancing beyond the ugliness of medieval Christendom toward a more humane Christian witness to the Jewish people. And the position he took was that Jewish existence as Jewish existence should end, gently, through evangelism rather than coercion.

Clermont-Tonnerre was not a defender of the ancien régime's Jewish disabilities. He was a leading voice for Jewish emancipation in a National Assembly debate where some delegates wanted to maintain the centuries-old exclusions. His famous formulation — everything to Jews as individuals, nothing to Jews as a nation — was understood at the time as a defense of Jewish rights against those who wanted to keep Jews as a permanently inferior caste. He was on the liberal side of the argument. And his liberalism took the form of demanding that Jewish corporate existence be dissolved as the price of admission to French citizenship.

Marx was not a populist scapegoater of Jewish bankers. He was, in his own self-understanding, the deeper analyst, locating Jewish economic behavior within the structural critique of capitalism, distinguishing his position from the vulgar Jew-hatred of the conservative populists. He was a radical, and he understood his radicalism as the alternative to the cruder forms of antisemitism that produced pogroms and individual scapegoating. And his alternative was that Jewish existence as expressed in social form be abolished along with the conditions producing it.

Marr is the hardest of the four to call respectable, but in his own moment, he positioned himself as scientific and modern against what he portrayed as backward religious bigotry. He coined the word "antisemitism" precisely to give the position a scientific register, distinguishing it from the superstitious Christian Jew-hatred of the past. His self-understanding was that he was offering a sober racial analysis — modern, biological, Darwinian — in contrast to medieval prejudice. And his sober racial analysis demanded racial separation that culminated, two generations later, in industrialized murder.

Each framework, then, performed the same operation. It identified a cruder, more vulgar form of antisemitism prevalent in its environment. It defined itself explicitly against that cruder form. It articulated the same prior assumption — that Jewish existence required resolution — in the respectable contemporary vocabulary of its moment. And it understood itself, by its own lights, to be antisemitism's opposite: the moral progress over what came before.

This is what the German Conservatives were doing in the Pall Mall Gazette of 1881. They were not confused or hypocritical. They had located the moral high ground in being against the brutalities while embracing the well-founded Question. That is a stable, coherent, durable cultural-political achievement: the construction of an acceptable antisemitism, articulated in whatever vocabulary the era considers serious, sincerely understood by its adherents to be the antithesis of the vulgar form they reject.

The achievement is what made the framing so durable. Each generation could point to a worse version — one that they did not endorse — and locate themselves on the right side of history relative to it. The Reform Christian was not a Crusader. The French Republican was not an absolutist excluder. The Marxist was not a Pale of Settlement antisemite. The racial scientist was not a credulous superstitious peasant. Each could, with full sincerity, distinguish his position from antisemitism as he understood antisemitism — while occupying a position that carried forward the same load-bearing assumption that animated every cruder form.

The structural reading

When you place the four frameworks beside one another, the diagnostic is unavoidable. Frank wanted Jewish religious existence to end. Clermont-Tonnerre wanted Jewish communal existence to end. Marx wanted Jewish economic existence to end. Marr wanted Jewish biological existence to end. Each framework specified a different mode of Jewish existence as the relevant one and demanded its termination. None of them were content with Jewish existence continuing as itself.

The society's treatment of Jews was never considered the problem. The Jews themselves were the problem. And soon enough, even the respected academics admitted this. In 1879, Heinrich von Treitschke — professor at the University of Berlin, the most prominent German historian of his generation — said it without ornament in the pages of the Preußische Jahrbücher: 'Die Juden sind unser Unglück.' The Jews are our misfortune. This phrase was first published in the most prestigious journal of German political thought as an enlightened viewpoint. 

The Nazis recognized it for what it was. 

The Jewish Question was the socially acceptable form of antisemitism. It was sophisticated: serious analysis, considered solutions, learned treatises, careful debate. It carefully distinguished itself from the earlier, crude manifestations of antisemitism. And the world, by and large — including most but not all  European Jews themselves — accepted this framing. 

Almost no one considered that there was an alternative way of looking at Jews in Europe, of dissolving the Jewish question altogether. Yet there was an another way that emerged — in the New World. And only when compared against Europe can the genius of the American system be recognized, which is the topic of the next essay.

Tragically, the progressive Europeans did not recognize that the liberal, serious, progressive Jewish Question itself, that they debated endlessly as the enlightened alternative to pogroms and blood libels, is what would directly lead to genocide.

Wednesday, April 29, 2026

Peter Beinart's latest piece in the New York Times makes the argument that right-wing anti-Zionism is genuinely antisemitic because it roots Israel's behavior in Jewish identity, while left-wing anti-Zionism is morally serious because it roots Israel's behavior in systems — colonialism, nationalism, and power. Tucker Carlson blames Israel's crimes on its Jewishness; progressives analyze structures. Therefore, Beinart suggests, the two are categorically different, and the progressive arguments are serious and fact-based.

The argument is superficially appealing, but it confuses vocabulary with logic. Both versions of anti-Zionism, right and left, turn out to depend on the same underlying premise: that Jews cannot be trusted to tell the truth — a conclusion the piece will earn, not assert.

The left's central accusations against Israel are claims about intent, not descriptions of behavior. Genocide requires the intent to destroy a people. Apartheid requires the intent to permanently dominate. Colonialism requires the intent to displace and replace. If your evidence for those accusations is based on reading minds, it is not evidence — unless there is no other credible explanation.

There is one, and it is more credible. The left's explanation — deliberate targeting, racial domination, eliminationist expansionism — requires attributing to Israel a set of intentions that Israel explicitly denies and that the historical and strategic evidence does not support. Israel's explanation fits the facts better: Israel is a Jewish state built by a people who internalized two thousand years of antisemitism as lived experience rather than historical abstraction, whose founding principle of Never Again functions as an operational imperative rather than an empty slogan, and whose moral framework derives from three thousand years of Jewish ethical thinking that the West itself largely inherited — and that the left applies selectively, inverting it against its source.

That last point matters more than it usually gets credit for. Israel is not a state indifferent to civilian casualties. It is a state whose entire military and legal culture is organized around minimizing them, because that is what its moral tradition demands. The IDF's doctrine of purity of arms, the military advocate general's office, the post-operation investigations, the evacuation warnings that forfeit tactical surprise — these are the institutional expression of a moral seriousness that runs through Jewish law on the conduct of war. And they are precisely why Hamas uses human shields. That strategy only works because Hamas correctly calculates that Israel will accept higher costs to its own soldiers rather than kill civilians indiscriminately. An army with genocidal intent does not generate that calculation in its enemies; it generates the opposite one.

What the left consistently refuses to recognize is that Israel is not choosing between war and peace. It is choosing between two moral costs: accept civilian casualties in Gaza while fighting an enemy that has made those casualties structurally unavoidable, or allow that enemy to terrorize Israeli civilians forever and with impunity. That is a genuine moral dilemma, the kind that three thousand years of Jewish ethical tradition was actually developed to navigate. The left's framework collapses it into a morality play with only one moral agent — Israel — and one set of lives that count. The moral cost of allowing Hamas to terrorize Israeli civilians indefinitely simply does not register as a cost. That omission is not an oversight; it is the premise.

This framing also resolves what the left's framework struggles to explain structurally. Israel is not a colonial project in any meaningful sense; it is the return of a people to their ancestral homeland, a homeland they never ceased to inhabit, mourn, or orient their prayers toward. It extends full citizenship to Arab Israelis, seats them on its Supreme Court, and elects them to its parliament, while maintaining Jewish survival as a founding priority — a priority that is entirely coherent given the history. And it allows thousands of trucks of aid into Gaza even while fighting there, because feeding civilians in a war zone is consistent with its own moral position. That last fact is almost never processed seriously by the left, because it is flatly inconsistent with the assumption of Israeli immorality that anchors their framework.

Which is where the epicycles begin. Arab judges on Israel's Supreme Court? Tokenism. LGBTQ rights? Pinkwashing — a deliberate propaganda strategy to distract from "apartheid." Evacuation warnings before strikes? Public relations. Aid convoys into Gaza? Cover for genocide. Nothing counts against the theory; everything gets absorbed into it, reclassified as deception, filed under further evidence that the malice runs deeper than it appears.

The pro-Israel explanation is consistent with the facts as they present themselves. The left's explanation is coherent only by reclassifying every inconvenient fact as performance. One framework has to keep adding mind-reading and assumptions of deception to survive contact with reality. The other doesn't. Which means there is no structural difference between the progressive position and a conspiracy theory.

I've written before about the difference between correspondence and coherence theories of truth, and how conspiracy theories are epistemologically indistinguishable from the coherence model. In a correspondence framework, claims are tested against reality, and evidence can falsify them. In a coherence framework, claims are judged by how well they fit the narrative, and contradictions are reinterpreted until the system stays intact. Conspiracy theories survive exactly this way: counterevidence doesn't weaken the theory, it proves how deep the conspiracy goes.

The contemporary left critique of Israel has adopted that structure. Israel isn't liberal — it's pretending to be. Its institutions aren't genuine — they're performative. Its justifications aren't honest — they're propaganda. The particular content of the accusation varies, but the underlying move is the same: nothing Israel or its supporters say or demonstrate can be taken at face value, because the deception is total. Which is exactly how antisemites have looked at Jews for centuries — deceptive, cunning, conspiratorial, pursuing a hidden agenda of power over non-Jews.

Beinart argues that the left avoids essentializing Jews because it speaks the language of systems rather than identity. But the left's systemic framework only remains coherent if it assumes, as a standing premise, that Jewish institutions are uniquely deceptive — that their visible behavior is systematically misleading and their explanations are not to be accepted at face value the way Hamas's claims are. Without that premise, the coherent narrative collapses, because counterevidence would have to be taken seriously and the theory would have to update.

Which brings us back to Tucker Carlson, whose theories Beinart correctly identifies as antisemitic conspiracy thinking. Carlson speaks openly about Jewish civilizational threat and hidden manipulation. The mechanism is recognizable: start with a fixed conclusion, interpret all evidence through that lens, reclassify contradiction as proof of how cunning the deception is.

Strip away the vocabulary, and the left's framework runs on the same engine. The right says Jews are dangerous because they intend to control the world; the left says Israel is dangerous because of its predetermined intentions to dominate its Arab neighbors and population. Both use the same logic and the same assumptions of Jewish evil. Only one of them is honest enough to say "Jews."

Beinart wants to draw a moral boundary, and there is one — only it falls in a different place than he draws it. The dividing line runs between those willing to test their claims against reality and those who build arguments that reality is not permitted to challenge. Cross that line and it no longer matters how sophisticated your language is or how carefully you avoid biological essentialism.

Beinart writes that "combating the anti-Israel right's conflation of Israel and Jewishness is made harder by pro-Israel American Jewish organizations that have conflated those two things as well." Yet Beinart's own argument depends on antisemitic tropes no less than Carlson's does — the assumption of Israeli Jewish intent to dominate and destroy, which is the complete opposite of how Jews and Israel understand themselves and their history. His framework requires that premise to function. Whether he sees it or not, he is in the same epistemic territory as Tucker Carlson, and his column's purpose — to persuade readers that he isn't — is the most clarifying thing about it.

Sunday, April 26, 2026

Last night, a man named Cole Allen walked up to a security checkpoint outside the White House Correspondents' Dinner armed with a shotgun, a handgun, and multiple knives. He told investigators he wanted to shoot Trump administration officials. A Secret Service agent was struck by a round; his vest saved his life. President Trump was rushed off the stage. It was the third attempt on a sitting or former president in two years.

Within minutes of the news breaking, Hasan Piker — whose initial reaction to the shooting was to joke about a conspiracy, implying press secretary Karoline Leavitt had foreknowledge because she had earlier said Trump would "bring the heat" and "shots will be fired" at the dinner — was doing what he does: performing for the crowd that has made him one of the most influential political voices in America.

Piker himself last year had endorsed the meme of "someone needs to do it" as a widely understood dog whistle to assassinate Trump.

Keep in mind that Piker is now considered mainstream.  He campaigns at rallies for Democratic candidates including Zohran Mamdani, Bernie Sanders, Summer Lee, and Abdul El-Sayed. The Harris campaign invited him to livestream from the 2024 Democratic National Convention. The New York Times has given him a flattering profile, a podcast appearance, and an op-ed. Ezra Klein's column originally ran under the headline "Hasan Piker Is Not the Enemy," changed after ridicule made the title untenable, though the defense of Piker within it was not changed.

So what exactly has the Times been platforming? Piker called for Sen. Rick Scott to be killed during a live stream: "If you cared about Medicare fraud or Medicaid fraud, you would kill Rick Scott." He is famous for arguing that America "deserved 9/11." When the New York Times podcast asked him about the murder of UnitedHealthcare CEO Brian Thompson, he never once suggested it was wrong to assassinate people or acknowledged the immorality of extrajudicial murder — instead immediately invoking Friedrich Engels's concept of "social murder" to justify the killing. He has told followers to "kill" and "murder" people "in the streets" and "let the streets soak in their red-capitalist blood." Piker  insists Hamas is "a thousand times better" than Israel and has described Hezbollah's banner as his favorite flag. On October 7, he said: "It doesn't matter if rape happened on October 7th. It doesn't change the dynamic for me."

This is the person the New York Times treats as a legitimate political voice worth treating with respect.




Now: is any of this illegal? Perhaps some of it — the First Amendment does not protect true threats or direct incitement to imminent lawless action, and there is a reasonable legal argument that some of Piker's statements approach that line. The Supreme Court's Brandenburg test requires that speech be directed to inciting imminent lawless action and likely to produce it. "You would kill Rick Scott" is closer to that line than most of Piker's defenders admit, and "let the streets soak in their red-capitalist blood" is closer still. But the legal question is genuinely uncertain, and legal scholars will argue about it.

The moral question is not uncertain at all.

There is a category error so common in contemporary American life that it has become invisible: the conflation of legality with morality. If something is legal, the argument goes, then objecting to it on moral grounds is at best squeamishness and at worst an assault on free speech. But legality and morality operate at entirely different levels. The law is a floor — the minimum standard of behavior a society can compel with the threat of force. Morality is the ceiling, or rather the open sky above it: the vast domain of behavior that the law was never designed to reach and cannot reach without becoming something far worse than what it is trying to prevent.

The First Amendment is a legal floor. It means the government cannot imprison Hasan Piker for his statements. It says nothing whatsoever about whether those statements are acceptable, whether platforms should carry them without consequence, whether media institutions should legitimize them with the imprimatur of prestigious bylines, whether sponsors should finance the audiences they cultivate, or whether political candidates should campaign alongside someone who has openly cheered political violence and the rape of Israeli women. The First Amendment protects Piker's right to speak. The rest of us retain our right — and bear our obligation — to respond.

The mechanism for that response is what the critics of political violence have always had available: social pressure, institutional accountability, and the withdrawal of legitimacy. Boycott sponsors. Refuse to appear alongside him on panels and stages. Decline to grant him the credibility that comes from being treated as a normal participant in civic debate. 

When The New York Times platforms him, it is engaged in immorality. When Democratic candidates campaign with him, they are making a conscious choice to promote immorality. When companies advertise on his show they are directly condoning his immorality.  To push back on all of these actions, both socially and financially,  would not be acts of censorship but of moral seriousness.

The book I am completing on America at 250 makes this point at length in a different context. America gives us rights but it also gives us obligations to be good citizens. We owe things to our families, our communities, and our nation. It is patriotic to oppose restrictions on free speech but it is also patriotic to oppose speech that erodes the quality of American life. And that is exactly what calls for violence, whether it is a coded message to assassinate the President or cheering the murder of a health care executive or threatening to use "any means possible" including violence to silence the speech of others. 

This is part of the covenant between the people of the United States. A nation where political violence is normalized cannot stand. This cannot be done by law; it can only be done by citizens, institutions, and cultural gatekeepers who understand that the legal floor is the beginning of the moral conversation, not the end of it.

The America that produced the First Amendment also produced the expectation that it would be used responsibly — that the freedom to speak carried with it the social obligation to speak in ways that did not incite neighbors against each other. That expectation was enforced not by courts but by culture: by editors who declined to publish certain things, by audiences who withdrew patronage from those who cheered violence, by communities that applied social consequences to people whose speech fell beneath a moral threshold that the law did not reach. That culture has not disappeared, but it has been systematically weakened by a generation that learned to treat the legal floor as the only relevant standard.

What happened last night at the Washington Hilton did not occur in a vacuum. Cole Allen did not emerge from nowhere. He emerged from an information environment in which a man with millions of followers can spend years normalizing violence against political targets, calling for senators to be killed, excusing the murder of executives, laughing at the rape of Israeli women, and then be invited to the Democratic National Convention, given a podcast slot by the New York Times, and welcomed as a surrogate by candidates running for the United States Senate. Maybe people like Piker manage to stay just barely on the side of legality, but how the rest of us respond to someone like that is the real test of what it means to be an American.

The First Amendment will survive Hasan Piker just fine. The question is whether American civic culture will — and the answer depends not on judges but on whether the rest of us remember that the floor is where behavior is compelled and the ceiling is where character, including the character of America itself, is revealed.

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